Adaptive rangeland resource use (mobility / otor)

Low mobility, leading to difficulty of adaptive selection of grazing sites

Herders do not engage in otor in autumn

There are not enough grazing areas, following from the recent substantial increase in competition from inbound migrants

Removal or transection of potential grazing areas by mines and farms

Insecurity of tenure of grazing areas: migrants or other competing land users may claim unoccupied sites; herders have incentives to remain physically present and make capital improvements at grazing sites

Not enough labour capacity within the household to allow segmentation, due to smaller groupings

Governance and development discourses in Mongolia promote “intensification” of land use and production

Rangeland in this region is sufficiently productive that regular mobility is not imperative

Flexible labour organization among households

Meta-household organization is limited in many of the selected areas

Most families spend winters as single households

Herds are too large to be pooled and grazed

Relatively low economic returns on livestock production require larger herds

Herders need cash incomes to maintain a “normal” standard of living, including post-secondary education for their children

The market economy and governance promote the individual and the household as property owners and economic actors

Reciprocity networks / ties with non-pastoralists

Herders generally rely on non-pastoral kin for access to markets and development projects

Access to social capital is uneven

“Relatedness” through kinship is a requirement for trust

Most herders have migrated to Yeroo from other parts of the country, and therefore have relatively thin kin networks

Diverse and flexible production strategies (technologies)

Many herders keep diverse herds, but others are relatively specialized (e.g., dairy cattle, goats, hybrid sheep)

Specialized production offers efficiencies of scale, allowing for higher returns on limited labour capacity

Specialized production encourages the acquisition of detailed and proprietary technical knowledge, providing competitive market advantages over generalized producers

Livestock insurance, price premiums, production standards, and other governance measures designed to limit risk to producers and consumers encourage herders to become stable and specialized suppliers in industrial market production systems

Diverse and flexible economic linkages

Herders sell wool, hides, and dairy products to a variety of traders (Mongolian and Chinese itinerant traders, buying points in Yeroo and Darxan)

Prices are generally set by the traders or downstream buyers, and are non-negotiable

Herders often sell to itinerant traders at lower prices due to the higher transaction costs and time requirements of selling in town (prices increase from Yeroo → Darxan → Ulaanbaatar)

Prices are set by the respective “free markets” (Mongolian, Chinese, or other) represented by buyers, and therefore only limited negotiation opportunities are available to producers

Many herders have low cash reserves and therefore need to sell frequently

Although some herders pool wool and hides to transport to Darxan, this requires cooperative decision-making and advance planning

There are incentives to sell opportunistically or on prospect due to highly fluctuating market prices

Herders have relatively weak capacity to influence market prices due to the lack of collective marketing or price negotiation; prices are set by downstream buyers

Herders do not generally have the individual or collective means to store commodities when prices are low

Learning and transmission of local knowledge

Herders share technical knowledge through local social networks

Knowledge of the downstream market is relatively limited

Technical knowledge provided by scientific organizations and development projects is of limited practical utility to small- scale producers

Reliable practical knowledge is obtained from observing and orally discussing others' direct experience

Herders privilege oral over written accounts, possibly due in part to the assumed reliability of knowledge embedded in social relations and subjective experience

Market actors gain advantages through secrecy and concealment ("proprietary knowledge")

Scientists and development workers often do not share the same priorities or experiences as local producers

Partial knowledge of production processes limits the visibility of social and ecological costs and impacts